The last sweep before the engagement was too early to detect the Japanese forces. Blue in particular was at terrible fault here, as she was specifically on picket duty and missed a fleet that passed within a mile of her. Originally CL-29, effective 1 July 1931, Chicago was redesignated CA-29 in accordance with the provisions of the London Naval Treatyof 1930. On 9 August, she engaged in the Battle of Savo Island. Bode also had priors- he was a martinet - disliked by his officers and had accused them of being drunk during the midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbour. After coming back aboard on his ship, he initially accused all the officers of being drunk. He took his ship out of the fight, while other ships were being sunk. Content is available under CC BY-SA 3.0 unless otherwise noted. Starting with the Hudsons performing air recon. As will be shown later, this would turn out to be a crucial mistake. It’s quite possible for two people to each be 100% responsible for a failure. Captain Howard D. Bode. Silver Palm penetrated around 18 feet into the cruiser's port bow, forward of the Number 1 gun mount. In reality they had won the engagement, but their bag was much smaller than claimed: on the USN side, heavy cruiser Chicago and a destroyer, USS De Haven, were lost. And he never warned any other Allied ship (or his commanding officers) that the Japanese were in the strait. He took no action to inform the other captains. BlackDragon98 said: Graf Spee could have sunk the 3 cruisers if it exerted itself but at the cost of the Graf Spee herself for sure. Ironically from Japanese records, and this has now been accepted by the USN’s History and Heritage Command. [4], On 2 February 1942, Chicago departed Pearl Harbor for Suvla, where she joined the newly formed ANZAC Squadron, later redesignated as Task Force 44. To be fair confusion reigned, and apparently some of the torpedoes he was dodging were from Bagley. Chicago was launched on 10 April 1930 by Mare Island Naval Shipyard under the supervision of Naval constructor Charles W. Fisher Jr., sponsored by Miss E. Britten; and commissioned on 9 March 1931, Captain Manley H. Simons in command. Significantly, Captain Bode never warned--11-- One captain, Howard Bode of the USS Chicago, ordered his ship’s radar turned off, for fear it would reveal his position. But yes the nighttime engagement made things a lot worse for the Allies. Even as aircraft flares blossomed over the Southern Group, and Canberra started her turn, few on Chicago figured out the facts. Mikawa launched float planes to scout the locations of the American ships and to provide illumination once the battle began. Neptune’s Inferno though, makes it sound more ambiguous; Bode’s decisions are looked at much more leniently because the nighttime engagement was confusing to everyone. by so many officers that it is unfair to assign so much of the blame to Captain By the time the first alert went out from the Patterson - “Warning! Looking back at this thread one thing I notice was never explicitly mentioned was that in addition to all his other failures in turning tail with the Chicago and running away sailing west for 40 minutes he was leaving behind the transports he was assigned to protect. 1 #277 McPherson. The northern force was engaged about 5-10 minutes after Bode knew they were there. There was a lot more blame that could have been passed out. He didn’t fire his guns until the Japanese had moved on. The ship was hit by four torpedoes, one forward of the bridge and three others in her engineering spaces. Based on his earlier actions 31 May-1 June in the IJN attack on Sydney Harbor, he, Bode, should have been summarily relieved and sent home to be reassigned. [12], After Savo Island, Chicago was repaired at Nouméa, Sydney, and San Francisco, where she arrived 13 October. If you plan to read much more of the history of naval operations in the Pacific during WWII, you’ll get very used to this. Chicago was one of six ships to receive the new RCA CXAM radar in 1940. It is telling that the Japanese spotted three separate individual destroyers (Blue, Ralph Talbot, Jarvis) prior to opening up on Canberra. Captain Ralph O. Davis gave the order to abandon ship shortly before Chicago sank stern first, 20 minutes later at .mw-parser-output .geo-default,.mw-parser-output .geo-dms,.mw-parser-output .geo-dec{display:inline}.mw-parser-output .geo-nondefault,.mw-parser-output .geo-multi-punct{display:none}.mw-parser-output .longitude,.mw-parser-output .latitude{white-space:nowrap}11°25′S 160°56′E / 11.417°S 160.933°E / -11.417; 160.933 (Approximate location of the wreck of USS Chicago)Coordinates: 11°25′S 160°56′E / 11.417°S 160.933°E / -11.417; 160.933 (Approximate location of the wreck of USS Chicago). And that is probably his key sin. He gave no orders regarding dispositions for the night. (See Jutland, too.) [4], When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Chicago was at sea with Task Force 12 and the Force immediately began a five-day sweep in the Oahu-Johnston-Palmyra triangle in an effort to intercept the enemy. Alas, confusion reigned on her bridge. Captain Bode, immersed in the plight of his ship, and fighting the damages incurred, ignored his role as task group commander and failed to issue orders to his ships or to inform his superiors of what had happened. Captain Howard D. Bode of the USS Oklahoma. Mikawa withdrew. Mikawa launched float planes to scout the locations of the American ships and to provide illumination once the battle began. I don’t remember any references about him not informing others or about being in command, only that he left the scene prematurely and didn’t do enough, nor did he help pick up survivors of the Juneau (although I think I now have the multiple engagements of Guadacanal campaign mixed up). Louisville took the disabled ship in tow, and was relieved by Navajo the following morning. He was put in command of the heavy cruiser USS Chicago after the Oklahoma sank (OHS Collections). It is likely none of this would have mattered. Last edited on 19 September 2013, at 18:16 . At the approximate time of the Patterson ’s warning message, Astoria ’s Officer of the Deck Burkey was acknowledging a course change from the Vincennes over TBS radio. (This accounts for a lot of commanders assuming that there was no surface action imminent.). On 27 January, she sailed from Nouméa to escort a Guadalcanal convoy. The patrolling fighters downed 18 of the attacking planes, but the damage was done. From 7–9 August, she supported the initial landings on Guadalcanal and others of the Solomon Islands, beginning the US counter-offensive against Japan. [17] The U.S. did not initially report the loss of Chicago to the public for some time, with Admiral Chester Nimitz—commander in chief of Allied Pacific forces—threatening to "shoot" any of his staff who leaked the loss to the press. Did Captain Bode (USS Chicago) really screw up at Guadacanal. When he received command. Commander Walker on the Patterson did everything right. Lost at Guadalcanal: The Final Battles of the Astoria and Chicago as Described by Survivors and in Official Reports. More than 17,000 Navy pilots qualified to take off and land on these converted aircraft carriers. Chicago shortly rendered fire support to the destroyer Patterson, which was dueling with Japanese light cruisers Yubari and Tenryu. The footnote provided for the source is pg 105-106 of Richard B. Franks excellent Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. In Neptune’s Inferno, it reports that Captain Bode of the USS Chicago took the blame during a Navy review for the defeat at Savo during the Guadacanal campaign. Once the Japanese were spotted and engaged. The bridge of any ship is where the captain commands the rest of the crew. Chicago did not get to fire her 203mm guns either, when she began a series of maneuvers undertaken to evade torpedoes. He never issued a single command to any of the other ships in his command. This is all in spite of the fact that all commanding officers were aware of multiple sightings of Mikawa’s fleet during the day. During the attacks, two burning Japanese planes silhouetted Chicago, providing enough light for further torpedo attacks; two hits caused severe flooding and loss of power. He ordered the senior skipper of the Southern Force, USS Chicago’s Captain Howard Bode, to take charge, saying, “I may or may not be back later,” and … Even as aircraft flares blossomed over the Southern Group, and Canberra started her turn, few on Chicago figured out the facts. Powered by Discourse, best viewed with JavaScript enabled. USS Chicago (CA-29) was a Northampton-class cruiser of the United States Navy that served in the Pacific Theater in the early years of World War II. Bode's actions during the engagement were questioned in an inquiry headed by Admiral Arthur Japy Hepburn. Just an update on this, I have finished reading “Flagship” which is specifically about the Canberra and Australia (and Shropshire). : 39 At 01:47, a torpedo, probably from Kako, hit Chicago ' s bow, sending a shock wave throughout the ship that damaged the main battery director. The American strike was launched at what was identified as “two carriers and four heavy cruisers” and turned out to only be the light carrier Shoho of the screening force. There is no doubt that McCain dropped the ball regarding He left the commanding officer of Chicago Captain Howard D. Bode in tactical command but Bode did not have his ship take the lead position in the patrol assuming Crutchley would return bymidnight. Here are the problems with Bode’s actions that night. … Was it The senior officer present aboard Chicago ordered the crew to begin preparing for departure, and for USS Perkins to begin an anti-submarine screening patrol around the cruiser, orders that were revoked by the sceptical Captain Howard Bode when he arrived on board at around 23:30. He didn’t order his ship into the customary position for the commander’s ship. Chicago fought damage while continuing to engage until contact with the enemy was lost. Bode was in nominal command of the southern cruiser force. You may want to re-read the original poster’s handle…. so would someone like to explain Bode’s responsibility further? Turner fell behind his offloading schedules, and decided to stick around longer than was planned, but didn’t tell Fletcher. It … [6] At the time of the incident damage was estimated to be around $200,000 ($3.95 million today). ... USS_Chicago_(CL-29).jpg-- 89.199.55.113 13:20, 2 November 2008 (UTC) Return to "USS Chicago (CA-29)" page. So there wasn’t much time for a warning to do any good, and Bode never really had a chance to engage the Japanese. On 7 May, she proceeded, with the Support Group, to intercept and attack the Japanese Port Moresby invasion group. Pearl Harbor at least had the excuse of having occurred during peacetime; at Savo Island the USN allowed itself to be taken completely unawares by the Japanese in a forward combat zone after 9 months of war and lost five heavy cruisers and inflicted negligible damage to the Japanese in return. The author makes no bones about Bode acting extremely poorly. [4], On 1 May, Chicago was ordered from Nouméa to join Commander, Southwest Pacific, and on the 4th she supported Yorktown in her strike against the Japanese on Tulagi, Solomon Islands during the Battle of the Coral Sea. After a shakedown cruise to Honolulu, Tahiti and American Samoa, Chicago departed Mare Island on 27 July 1931 and sailed to the east coast, arriving at Fort Pond Bay, New York, on 16 August. After the battle, upon learning that he was to be censured for his actions, Captain Bode shot … Indeed, as I said in 2012 there was far more than enough blame to go around, but yes, Bode really did fuck up that badly at Savo Island. McCain, commanding the land based air assets in the Solomon’s area, didn’t conduct the air searches over the Slot on the previous afternoon as requested, and didn’t tell anyone that he couldn’t. [10] Three Japanese midget submarines had attacked Sydney Harbour. So Turner thought he had carrier cover. This article incorporates text from the public domain Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. The fact that someone else is also responsible doesn’t make you any less to blame. And all the Allied ships were significantly less alert than the Japanese. Bode. Crutchley probably did not leave much of a “pass down” for Bode before he (Crutchley) left the area to go meet with Turner. He was at a party. And his warnings helped the northern force not at all. At 1:47, as Captain Howard Bode was attempting to get Chicago into the fight, the ship was hit in the bow by a torpedo. Chicago took a couple of hits… and ran away. Chicago's captain, Howard D. Bode, was ashore when his ship opened fire. He was also captain of the Oklahoma when she went down at Pearl harbour although as he was ashore he can’t cop too much for that. Bode ordered his 5 in (127 mm) guns to fire star shells towards the Japanese column, but the shells did not function. Chicago then lost sight of the enemy ship and was left without an enemy to pursue. [16], The Japanese widely publicized the results of the engagement, claiming to have sunk two battleships and three cruisers. There, she became flagship of Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force, and operated with that force until 1940. The north and south cruiser forces were mauled, because the Japanese were able to approach undetected. Fighters from the nearby carrier Enterprise provided CAP for the wounded cruiser as she tried to make her way away from the battle area. Commander Walker on the Patterson, put his crew on condition 2, just like most of the rest of the fleet. The Scouting Force operated along the east coast and in the Caribbean until October and then returned to base at San Pedro, California. Captain Bode (former commander of the USS Chicago: 01/17/1942 - 12/1942 ) shot himself in Panama after being censured by the Navy for failing to take appropriate actions in warning the fleet of enemy contact in the first Battle of Savo Island. [4] Capt. Warning! This place seems to be filled with military history experts (buffs?) Chicago received three battle stars. Frankly, I’m not certain myself. While others certainly deserve a share of the blame. Crutchley in particular should shoulder a lot of blame. The Naval Officer in Charge of Sydney, Rear Admiral Muirhead-Gould had been hosting a dinner at his official residence ‘Tresco’, attended by Captain H. D Bode, commanding officer of the USS Chicago, as sketchy details began to emerge of events on the harbour. For example, the USS Chicago broke off engagement with Japanese forces at the very height of a critical battle, The Battle of Savo Island, and her commander, Captain Howard D. Bode, subsequently committed suicide. [4], On the night of 31 May – 1 June, while in port in Sydney Harbour, Australia, Chicago fired on an attacking Japanese midget submarine. Fletcher (carrier group admiral) withdrew his carriers for refueling, but his message didn’t reach Turner (supply transport admiral off Tulagi). One commander (for whatever reason) thinks his counterparts know what he knows (or can see), and doesn’t think to send detailed messages. But Allies still had 3 cruisers and 11 destroyers unengaged. He only allowed one sweep from his fire control radar every half an hour. This independently published work of historical fiction deals with the real-life commanding officer of USS CHICAGO at the battle of Savo Island on the night of 8-9 August 1942, and the aftermath of that battle. They significantly miss He didn’t even send any warnings to any other ships, or to his commanding officers. At the Battle of Savo Island, Captain Bode commanded USS Chicago (CA-29). [4], In February 1932, Chicago conducted gunnery exercises with other ships of the Scouting Force preliminary to Fleet Problem XIII off the California coast. This independently published work of historical fiction deals with the real-life commanding officer of USS CHICAGO at the battle of Savo Island on the night of 8-9 August 1942, and the aftermath of that battle. Chicago took a torpedo and a gun hit with little damage, and was saved further hits when she saw the trail ship of Mikawa's force and went after it, sailing in the opposite direction of the attacking force. Yes, he really did screw up badly at Guadalcanal. They hadn’t done nearly the nighttime training the Japanese had. After all he had seen reports of an approaching Japanese force. [8], In 1934, the annual fleet exercises were held in the Caribbean, followed in May 1934 by the Presidential Fleet Review in New York Harbor. In a position to intercept enemy surface units which attempted to attack Port Moresby, Chicago also provided cover for the arrival of American troops on New Caledonia. Though the report was not intended to be made public, Bode learned of its findings and shot himself on 19 April 1943, dying the next day. One became entangled in an anti-submarine boom net, and two were able to pass through. Admiral Hepburn did a thorough investigation and came to the conclusion Bode deserves censure. He had barely slept for three days, taking short catnaps on his flag bridge. Mikawa could have swung back south hit the transport anchorages and the east cruiser force and destroyed the Allied forces piecemeal. Captain Howard Bode was one of two officers singled out for official censure months after that disaster. Aerial reconnaissance coming within a mile of properly identifying what they spotted was an extremely rare event. Bode didn’t send any orders to any other ships. I agree with Bartman about commander Walker. Chicago was launched on 10 April 1930 by Mare Island Naval Shipyard, sponsored by Miss E. Britten; and commissioned on 9 March 1931, Captain Manley Hale Simons in command. The thing about blame in the military is that contrary to popular opinion, it isn’t zero sum. On the night of the 29th, as the ships approached that bitterly contested island, Japanese aircraft attacked the force and the Battle of Rennell Island was underway. were approaching? (Crutchley doesn’t escape either). As a result, tactical command of the Southern Group fell to Captain Howard Bode, CO of Chicago, which was in trail behind HMAS Canberra. During the afternoon, the Japanese attacked again with 20 G4M “Betty” bombers. One torpedo passed near Chicago and destroyed the converted ferry HMAS Kuttabul, nearby, killing 21 sailors, while the second torpedo failed to detonate, and skidded ashore onto Garden Island. There were communications failures all over the place, both strategic, and tactical. Chicago's captain, Howard D. Bode, was ashore when his ship opened fire. One was then disabled by depth charges, but the other managed to fire two torpedoes at Chicago. Last edited: Jul 18, 2020. So everyone assumed that no news was good news, in terms of enemy activity there. Three officers aboard Chicago were killed in their quarters during the collision, and an enlisted man's arm had to be amputated as well. [18] Details of the battle emerged in US newspapers as early as 16 February 1943. The book is somewhat ambiguous towards the responsibility of Bode but overall seems favorable. I consider him to be the most culpable. Three months earlier in the same area on the first day of the Battle of the Coral Sea both sides launched strikes on what they thought was the other sides main carrier force. I came a way with the feeling that their were so many screw ups Navajo and the escorting destroyers rescued 1,049 survivors from Chicago,[14] but 62 of her crew died. Communications failures are the bug-a-boo of many snafu’s. The entry can be found here. In the end he was certainly the designated scapegoat for the whole mess. He ordered the senior skipper of the Southern Force, USS Chicago’s Captain Howard Bode, to take charge, saying, “I may or may not be back later,” and steamed off on Australia into the dark at 9:23 pm. The book is somewhat ambiguous towards the responsibility of Bode but overall seems favorable. Oh, it was quite intentional. Former Captain Howard D. Bode's actions during the Battle of Savo Island were questioned in a US Navy inquiry headed by Admiral Hepburn. Savo Island was arguably the worst defeat the US Navy suffered during the war. But Bode’s mistakes were still mistakes. They had already turned away from him by the time he knew they were there. [15] A final attack force of Japanese torpedo bombers failed to find the remaining U.S. Bode managed not to get a single message out to the group he has in command of, or to any of the other groups. They significantly missidentified the Japanese strike force (they underestimated it’s strength). Captain Bode, in tactical command, was in his cabin, and hurried up. Associated Press, "Cost of Repairs to Cruiser $200,000", CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (, "US Cruisers List: Light/Heavy/Antiaircraft Cruisers, Part 1", Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-c/ca29.htm, "Battle of Rennell Island: Setback in the Solomons", "US Destroyer, Cruiser Sunk in Solomons Battle", USS Chicago (CA-29, originally CL-29), 1931–1943, NavSource Online: Cruiser Photo Archive USS CHICAGO (CL/CA 29), List of cruisers of the United States Navy, Shipwrecks and maritime incidents in 1933, Shipwrecks and maritime incidents in January 1943, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=USS_Chicago_(CA-29)&oldid=1003615607, World War II cruisers of the United States, World War II shipwrecks in the Pacific Ocean, United States Navy Illinois-related ships, Wikipedia articles incorporating text from the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, 8 × 5 in (127 mm)/25 caliber anti-aircraft guns, 2 × 3-pounder 47 mm (1.9 in) saluting guns, This page was last edited on 29 January 2021, at 21:07. [11], During June and July 1942, Chicago continued to operate in the Southwest Pacific. But a US court of inquiry couldn’t very well censure a RN flag officer. Chicago did not get to fire her 203mm guns either, when she began a … The latter ship attempted to attack, but quickly came under heavy fire and was put out of action, listing and on fire. I just finished reading a book on the battle by an Australian who was on the Canberra. late night meeting back at the transport anchorage just as the Japanese [9] Chicago continued to operate out of San Pedro until 29 September 1940, when she sailed to Pearl Harbor. really necessary to drag the Flag officer in charge of the defense force to a She was the second US Navy ship to be named after the city of Chicago. And managed to steer his ship right onto the Japanese torpedoes. Captain Bode of the Chicago was under the false impression that his radar would give away his position. Effective 1 July 1931, Chicago was redesignated a heavy cruiser, CA-29, because of her 8-inch guns in accordance with the provisions of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. The landings were meant to deny their use to the Japanese as bases, especially the nearly completed airfield at Henderson Field that was being constructed on Guadalcanal. identified the Japanese strike force (they underestimated it’s strength). [4] She was originally classified as a light cruiser, CL-29, because of her thin armor. As it did so, both Chicago and Canberra were illuminated by aerial flares. Captain Bode and USS Chicago is the American exception, not the general rule. During March and April, the cruiser operated off the Louisiade Archipelago, covering the attacks on Lae and Salamaua, New Guinea. And none of the destroyers spotted an entire Japanese fleet. Early in the engagement a hit from a Japanese destroyer's torpedo caused minor damage to the ship's bow. Captain Bode, (USS Chicago Actual) the guy left holding the bag in Crutchley's absence, was no Schley. No real blame there (at least for Bode). There, she became flagship of Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force, and operated with that force until 1940. air recon. After surviving a midget submarine attack at Sydney Harbour and serving in battle at the Coral Sea and Savo Island in 1942, she was sunk by Japanese aerial torpedoes in the Battle of Rennell Island, in the Solomon Islands, on 30 January 1943. If you’re the only one who screwed up, you’re 100% responsible, but if someone else also screwed up, that doesn’t make you any *less *responsible. (And of course, he later committed suicide over his effective demotion). But Bode still had a responsibility to the remaining Allied forces that he ignored. Frankly, I’m not certain myself. And Hepburn interviewed everyone available. And then he went to sleep. 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